Papers & Opinions

Credit Rationing, Electoral Politics, and Incentives
This paper develops a unified framework linking credit rationing, electoral politics, and credit terms. Vote-share-maximizing politicians moderate policy in response to credit market frictions, generating...

Economics and Politics of Student Debt Relief
We study student debt relief as the product of probabilistic voting by an electorate that includes both college graduates and non-college laborers. While politicians favor...

Corporate Political Interests in Absentia
We formalize Zingales’ (2017) argument about the link between corporate economic characteristics and political influence in a setup that exhibits an inverse relationship between citizens’...

Bailouts by Popular Demand
We characterize conditions under which the majority of voters supports a bailout despite incurring bailout expenditures. This yields inefficiently high investments when economic prospects are...

Collective and Individual Investments in Financial Literacy
A collective and an individual investment in financial literacy, plus intrinsic skills, contribute to each household’s financial literacy. We show that low- and high-skilled households...

Bank Influence at a Discount
In a general equilibrium framework, we study the cost incurred by banks to ”buy” influence on capital regulation via campaign contributions. Our central result is...
Papers & Opinions

Credit Rationing, Electoral Politics, and Incentives
This paper develops a unified framework linking credit rationing, electoral politics, and credit terms. Vote-share-maximizing politicians moderate policy in response to credit market frictions, generating...

Economics and Politics of Student Debt Relief
We study student debt relief as the product of probabilistic voting by an electorate that includes both college graduates and non-college laborers. While politicians favor...

Corporate Political Interests in Absentia
We formalize Zingales’ (2017) argument about the link between corporate economic characteristics and political influence in a setup that exhibits an inverse relationship between citizens’...

Bailouts by Popular Demand
We characterize conditions under which the majority of voters supports a bailout despite incurring bailout expenditures. This yields inefficiently high investments when economic prospects are...

Collective and Individual Investments in Financial Literacy
A collective and an individual investment in financial literacy, plus intrinsic skills, contribute to each household’s financial literacy. We show that low- and high-skilled households...

Bank Influence at a Discount
In a general equilibrium framework, we study the cost incurred by banks to ”buy” influence on capital regulation via campaign contributions. Our central result is...
Papers & Opinions

Credit Rationing, Electoral Politics, and Incentives
This paper develops a unified framework linking credit rationing, electoral politics, and credit terms. Vote-share-maximizing politicians moderate policy in response to credit market frictions, generating...

Economics and Politics of Student Debt Relief
We study student debt relief as the product of probabilistic voting by an electorate that includes both college graduates and non-college laborers. While politicians favor...

Corporate Political Interests in Absentia
We formalize Zingales’ (2017) argument about the link between corporate economic characteristics and political influence in a setup that exhibits an inverse relationship between citizens’...

Bailouts by Popular Demand
We characterize conditions under which the majority of voters supports a bailout despite incurring bailout expenditures. This yields inefficiently high investments when economic prospects are...

Collective and Individual Investments in Financial Literacy
A collective and an individual investment in financial literacy, plus intrinsic skills, contribute to each household’s financial literacy. We show that low- and high-skilled households...

Bank Influence at a Discount
In a general equilibrium framework, we study the cost incurred by banks to ”buy” influence on capital regulation via campaign contributions. Our central result is...