Banking | Special interest politics | Theory

Bank Influence at a Discount

By Stylianos Papageorgiou | Posted on 8 November 2021

In a general equilibrium framework, we study the cost incurred by banks to ''buy" influence on capital regulation via campaign contributions. Our central result is that banks buy influence at...
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Central banking | Empirics | Financial markets | Regulation

The Partisanship of Financial Regulators

By Matthew Henriksson | Posted on 27 September 2021

We analyze the partisanship of Securities and Exchange Commissioners (SEC) and members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Fed). Using the language-based approach of Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (Econometrica,...
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Financial markets | Political institutions | Regulation

Delegation and the Regulation of U.S. Financial Markets

By Thomas Groll | Posted on 7 July 2021

We analyze the institutional determinants of U.S. financial market regulation with a general model of the policy-making process in which legislators delegate authority to regulate financial risk at both the...
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