The Geoeconomics of Imports: Evidence from UN Security Council Elections

Paper

Yanduo Chen
Author: Yanduo Chen

Nbr. Publication(s): 1
Position: PhD student
Affiliation: Singapore Management University
Member of PolEconFin since: 19 Mar 2026

This paper examines how trade functions as U.S. geoeconomic statecraft and how firms participate in it. Exploiting elections to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), we show that U.S. public firms increase imports from a country by 16 percent when it rotates onto the council. This increase is unique to the U.S. relative to comparable developed countries without permanent UNSC membership and is concentrated in products where elected countries lack comparative advantage, reflecting strategic reallocation of U.S. imports rather than improvements in exporter economies. Consistent with geopolitical motivations, the effect is concentrated among swing countries and is more pronounced when the elected country holds greater agenda-setting power. We identify two channels of import politicization: policy concessions and rent-seeking by firms. First, imports from newly elected countries face lower duty rates despite unchanged trade costs and prices, and federal procurement shifts toward their contractors and products. Second, the increase is disproportionately driven by firms whose top lobbying issues are overseen by senators who serve concurrently on the Foreign Relations Committee, with the effect increasing in senator seniority. These firms exhibit lower operational efficiency but higher subsequent valuations. Finally, countries with larger import increases during their UNSC terms exhibit greater voting alignment with the U.S.

Co-Author(s): Jing Wu

# Tags: Geoeconomics | Lobbying | Political economy | Supply Chain

Link to Paper
PREVIOUS PAPER:

Author: Stylianos Papageorgiou

Author: Yanduo Chen