This paper studies how partisanship affects mutual fund information processing at the firm level. Using textual analysis of earnings call transcripts, I identify discussions on partisan-sensitive topics, such as climate change, pandemic, and healthcare. I find that partisan funds react more strongly to topics aligned with their ideological beliefs and trade more after firms increase…
This paper shows that corporate lobbying generates within-industry effects. Firms that do not lobby experience negative stock returns around the passage of new federal bills and resolutions that attract more lobbying from their competitors. To show that the value losses are related to lobbying, I use plausibly exogenous variation in lobbying intensity generated by lawsuits…
We study the extent to which individuals’ consumption decisions are influenced by firms’ stances on controversial social issues and the implied incentives for firms to take such stances. We use transactions from a major payment card company to predict cardholders’ likely social alignment with firm stances and to quantify effects on consumption. The social stances…
I argue creditors, plausibly considering the link between bank lobbying and government bailouts, reflect the financial-safety-net aspect of bank lobbying. My structural estimation based on U.S. data suggests bank lobbying is negatively associated with the occurrence of a run-like equilibrium when a bank is subject to multiple equilibria. The estimated effect on bank risk and…
Can political beliefs, particularly about benefits of war versus peace, move thick financial markets? We document that following an unlikely victory by French citizen-soldiers during the German Siege of Paris (1870), prices of the highly liquid French sovereign bond diverged substantially and persistently there versus elsewhere. While France resisted, Parisian prices were higher and responded…
This paper studies how hiring public officials affects firms’ ability to win government contracts in Japan. We link personnel transitions of public officials to contractors and government contracts awarded to those contractors over time. Using within-firm variation, we find evidence consistent with exchange of post-public employment for increases in government contract awards. Our results suggest…